Abstract This paper describes intellectual property legislation in the European
'public domain' is, as there have been some debates about this 7 , a special kind of information certainly belongs to it.
a. A few notes on the nature of databases
Science, business, education, economy, law, culture, all areas of human development 'work' with the constant aid of data. Databases 8 play a crucial role within science research: the body of scientific and technical data and information in the public domain is massive 9 and factual data are fundamental to the progress of science. 10 But the progress of science is not the only process affected by the way people use databases. Stock exchange data are absolutely necessary to any analyst; access to comprehensive databases of large scale is an everyday activity of a teacher, an educator, an academic or a lawyer. There are databases collecting all sorts of different data: nuclear structure and radioactive decay data for isotopes (the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File) and genes sequences (the Human Genome Database), prisoners'
DNA data ('DNA offender database' 11 ), names of people accused for drug offenses (NADDIS 12 ), telephone numbers 13 , legal materials 14 and many others. .information is in the public domain to the extent that no person has the right to exclude anyone else from using the specified information in a particular way. In other ways, information is in the public domain of all users are equally privileged to use it…', at 360. See also detailed analysis of what the public domain is in Litman J., The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990) , who described public domain as a commons, that includes those aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect., id. at 975. The notion of 'public domain' has also been (unfairly) dismissed, Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, (1993) 41 Journal of the Copyright Society 137. 8 The term 'database' is standard in legal discourse; a better term is, I think, 'information system', as database has come to signal everything, from a website to a list of telephone numbers. 16 one has, some times, to pay an additional fee to enter the databaseunless the database is offered in the Internet for free, or someone else has paid for the user (for example, the University for a student). As proven in part, I think, by the above disparity in numbers, access to the Internet in developing countries is limited, although growing rapidly in most of them 17 .
Whether one has or has not access to the Internet is already a kind of law, determining the use of an online 18 's database by a prospective user. After this crucial, for the developing countries especially, starting point, there are other laws 19 , regulating how and how much one can 'take' from a database. These laws were (and still are, but not exclusively) usually contract 20 (private arrangements between the 15 China, for example, has online databases of legislation and policies (11% of the total), of financial and stock information (2%), of scientific and technical information (15%), of newspapers and periodicals (12%) and products (60%), http://www.cnnic.gov.cn/tj/2.shtml#2.1.4, see also footnote n. (1996) . In this case, Judge Easterbrook held that a shrinkwrap (contractual) license to use an electronic database (the terms of which license were not known to the buyer of the box with the database CDs in it before he bought it) was enforceable against the buyer, irrespective of copyright law (under which, the copying of the database's material3.000 telephone numberswas legal, as the database was not original enough to deserve copyright protection).
owner and the user of a database) and copyright 21 (general arrangement of how much can be taken, under the doctrine of 'fair use'). Quite apart from these two controls, internationally there is now a trend towards privatization of information, for the benefit of database owners, who in their almost absolute majority, come from the 25 See the first version of the sui generis right in (unoriginal) databases of Art. 2 (5), First Draft, Directive on the legal protection of databases, which was a right of the maker of a database to prevent the unauthorized extraction or reutilzation from a database, or its contents, in whole or in substantial part, for commercial purposes. The right was, then, limited to 'unfair extraction', and 'unfair' meant then, a use for commercial purposes (this right could perfectly cover the case, for example, of ProCD v. Zeindenberg, footnote 20, and no need to seek protection from contract law would then accrue). 26 Art. 7(1) of the Directive. 27 The Directive also contains provisions, before the sui generis right, on copyright protection of the original (in the selection of arrangement of the material the author's own intellectual creation) databases, but the significance of these provisions, in front of the extremely stronger protection of the unoriginal databases with the sui generis right, is almost 'extinguished'. No database producer would care to prove originality etc, when it is, in fact, less effectively protected and when 'substantial' in investment, to give rise to the sui generis right, has been accepted so easily. Directive was not a solution to the alleged problem c. the Directive enforced intellectual property kind protection to data, something which was inappropriate, clashed with the history and philosophy of intellectual property laws and had never happened before e. the Directive implemented a perpetual exclusive right to data belonging to the public domain (and so, 'privatized' the public sphere, to fortify private financial interests) f. the Directive insults the freedom of speech and harms scientific research and academic freedom.
Nevertheless, the Directive is now fully implemented in Europe (even if many countries missed the deadline). The caselaw (there was a lot of litigationyet another problem) we have from these countries in fact confirmed the fears of the scholars who published comments etc. against the Directive; the most important cases, which reached, as a cluster, the European Court of Justice, were the British Horseracing Advocate General StixHackl firmly rejected all arguments against database protection under these circumstances and proposed (influentially, of course), inter alia, that a. it is irrelevant whether a database is 'a spinoff' or not b. that indirect extraction of data, which also happen to constitute part of a a database from publicly available sources, is also forbidden c. the term 'database' is to be construed widely d.
the databases' purpose is irrelevant as to its protection and e. the term 'obtaining data through substantial investment' is not the same as the creation of data, but when creation coincides with collection and verification then the condition of 'obtaining though substantial investment' is fulfilled. Lastly, and very importantly, dynamic databases (those which are updated usually) are protected as a whole for the Directive's 15 years term (in fact, forever, as most of them are constantly updated), and no new time limit starts for every new addition of data in the database. It is indeed hard to imagine an interpretation of the Directive, which could better justify its criticism or stronger protect the database producers' interests. Until the end of the year, we expect the European Court of Justice's final ruling, but Opinions by General
Advocates re influentialthere is no substantial reason to expect a deviation from this Opinion at this particular moment.
c. The American efforts: bills for and bills 'against'
Soon after the European Directive was enacted, intense pressures in the States lead to the deposition of a (first) bill for the protection of databases, HR3531, the 'Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Bill' of 1996. The 'unkind' reciprocity clause of the European Directive, that databases were to be 40 The 'spinoff' argument had been successful in lower European courts, and is a totally reasonable argument: the aim of the Directive was to protect a database, which was the result of substantive investment, not a database which would be produced anyway, as a byproduct of other activities. That Fixtures Limited wants to share some of the enormous profits of national betting agencies is of course understandable from a pure financial point of view, but this was simply not the kind of database which was in danger of elimination from piracy, should a law as the Directive not 'rush' to 'save' it. Justice 'sees' the sui generis right as so strong, then 'reciprocal' legislation, able to protect the interests of US publishers in Europe, has to be at least comparable ('feeble' protection will do no good); or, as the worst fears (rights in pure data) of the database legislation opponents will have been realized, it is equally 'crazy' to insist on offering same protection in the US (and so, 'please drop the entire discussion' highly improbable as well). 47 The act of 'extraction' was the 'permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form', while the act of 'utilization' was the making available to the public of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by any means, including the distribution of copies, by renting, or by online or other forms of transmission, including making the same available to the public at a place and at a time individually chosen by each member of the public. A substantial part was any portion of the database, including an accumulation of small portions, which is of qualitative or quantitative significance to the value of the database. 48 Art. 5. The protection of governmental databases was left to the states' discretion.
e. The position of the developing counties
The Draft Treaty never matured into a Treaty. The overwhelming majority of comments on the draft was against it, especially in the US, where the debate on the proposed bills had already begun. 50 Not all the reports came to this particular conclusion; for example, the study by Braunstein, id, sustained that the protection could benefit the developing countries. However, 'this position (Braunstein's) is based to a large extent on the application of theoretical tools developed originally for trage in goods. Unfortunately, these tools assume, among other restrictive assumptions, the absence of economics of scale, making their applicability to databases very limited…' (Lopez, id., p. 18). Also, the study on India by Vandrevala, id., contains some elements on the potential of India to commercialize governmental databases and therefore, possibly earning income by developing a database industry. But Vandrevala also points that there is a drawback of the new legislation, the problem of access to the protected works by the academic and scientific community (id., p. 29), a drawback which he proposes to address by specific exceptions for research etc. Quite another problem is, under Vandrevala, (id), that the '..psyche of the social and economic thinkers (in India) has always been against the grant of intellectual property rights…the recognition of new forms of intellectual property rights still remains a very contentious issue…'. (No proposal exists in the study to face this particular problem, not any attempt to explain why this general, as mentioned, distrust, may be wrong). 51 Zheng Shengli, id., p. 44. 52 Id., p. 58, : '..Driven by the profits and under budgetary pressure, the Government will be inclined to cooperate with private entities. As a result, the data which should have been publicized by the Government is now not accessible free of charge to the public. There will be less and less data in the public domain and the information already in the public domain will be available to the public in a restrictive way. However, the corresponding numbers for China are about 600, 20, 620 and 780 respectively. In the US, the total costs of public colleges is about 28% of its per capita GDP; in China, the corresponding number is about 94%. Therefore, Chinese students would have much less money to pay for the said license (to use protected databases) fees…', id., p. 48. The Report from Sherif El-Kassas, from the American University of Cairo, id., concludes that any new sui generis protection of database would detract from the public domain and thus significantly reduce the availability of free information and data, may create counter productive perpetual monopolies by allowing owners of databases to indefinitely expand the period of protection, will be harmful to the free flow of information in the scientific communities of the world, will be harmful to the development of the Internet and the software industry because many components of the software industry will become protected and hence will no longer be available for free use and utilization and will hamper many aspects of development in the developing and under developed world. Id., p. 10 (conclusions Riis's conclusions include that there is a strong case that optimal intellectual property regime in industrialized countries is not optimal is developing countries and that, in the short run, developing countries which typically are technologyimporting countries will loose social welfare by enhanced intellectual property standards, because higher intellectual property standards in the long run will lead to an increase in royalty payments to foreign right owners. 'The empirical evidence that we have collected from Latin America and the Caribbean..does not seem to support the argument in favor of introducing IPRs for nonoriginal databases, in that we have not observed that the incipient industry that exists in the region, apparently concentrated in the more advanced countries, is being damaged by the absence of sui generis legislation..', id., p. 29. 65 Wade, id, p. 5, '…research libraries around the world paid out 66% more for scientific monographs in 2001 than they did in 1986 and got 9% fewer monographs for their money and paid out 210% more for 5% fewer periodicals..'.
'control' of facts, once these have been made part of a protected, by intellectual property laws, database. Returning to the matter of a country's information commons, one wonders whether it is indeed moral for the developed world to press 66 developing countries and countries in transition into international agreements of dubious benefit to them 67 (TRIPS is an obvious example here) and then let its own enterprises make, inter alia, databases on this country's traditional knowledge, for example, 'lock' the contents of the databases through database protection laws (lasting in effect forever remember Advocate General StixHackl's opinion in the EU 68 ) and therefore, The increased prominence of IPRs in US foreign policy is a story of sectoral politics in which wellorganized industry groups representing the chemical, pharmaceutical, entertainment and software industries pushed the US government to use trade sanctions against countries that were argued to be lax in protecting their copyrights, patents and trademarks…business lobbying had made TRIPS a high priority for the US in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and considerable pressure was used to generate consent. Indeed the unilateral strategy was used as a tool to gain acceptance of the multilateral strategy, as the US explicitly used Special 301 provisions to coerce larger developing countries, such as Korea and Brazil, into accepting the inclusion of IPRs in the ..negotiations…'given a choice between America sanctions or a negotiated multilateral agreement, the TRIPS agreement began to look better'….' (p. 7/8). On pressure, see also Lastly, the abdication of control by the Icelanders was spotted out as in need of a very careful consideration 85 . It follows that the genetic information of Iceland properly belonged to its public domain; even if Icelanders lacked the 12 million dollars and the technical infrastructure to carry out this project, if they wished to carry it out, this did not mean that another country had the moral justification to do it, and enjoy its fruits.
DeCODE's argument that in this case, it was Iceland who had an obligation to benefit humanity 86 , allowing the use of the data from somebody who could do it, cannot hide the company's financial interests in the project, or cover its profit orientation behind a moral 'duty to the world'. If this were indeed the case, all developing countries would be morally bound to release their information commons to the financially powerful 83 representatives of this country, and quite another to impose, in fact, the same laws upon a practically defenseless developing country.
The question 'who owns information' has usually been dealt with as a matter to be resolved between private partiesindividuals. Cases have been brought to court because a plaintiff believes that a particular piece of information belongs to her and not to the defendant (for example, disputes about who is entitled to know a software program's code, who is entitled to know whether a doctor has an AIDS infection, who is entitled to use a telephone number for marketing purposes etc 90 ). In private law, we have devised special mechanisms to redress inequalities of power and abuses. The more powerful entities are treated as burdened with special obligations to protect their feebler contracting parties. Those who are able to exercise undue influence over others are legally treated very strictly. Perhaps, also in view of the extended pressures towards greater database legal protection, the time has come to consider in detail the application of the same legal principles in the cases between countries.
We should determine, in particular, in which cases individual countries have the right to own and control particular pieces of (their) information. In the case of developing countries, which are technologically impaired and lack fundamentals as basic goods for survival (food; water; basic pharmaceuticals), the control by the elsevier.com/locate/worlddev), '…world income distribution has become rapidly more unequal, when incomes are measured at market exchange rates and expressed in US dollars; world PPPincome polarization has increased, with polarization measured as richest to poorest decile; betweencountry world PPPincome inequality has been constant or falling since around 1980, with countries weighed by population; several serious studies find that world PPPincome inequality has increased over a period within the past two to three decades, taking account of both betweenand withincountry distributions; pay inequality within countries was sable or declining from the early 1960's to 19801982, then sharply and continuously increased toward greater inequality in manufacturing pay worldwide…absolute income gaps are widening and will continue to do so for decades…Aside from the moral case against it, inequality creates a kind of society that even crusty conservatives hate to live, unsafe and unpleasant….higher income inequality within countries goes with higher poverty….slower economic growth, higher unemployment and . 
